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Civil War Finance:  Lessons for Today 
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel  
INTRODUCTION 
Randolph Bourne was a young Progressive radical during 
World War I.1  Viewing the grotesque excesses of Woodrow 
Wilson’s wartime administration, he wrote an essay in which he 
coined the maxim: “War is the health of the State.”2  The essay 
was only published posthumously, because Bourne himself 
became a victim of the war-induced flu epidemic.3 
Economists and historians have confirmed the validity of 
Bourne’s maxim in two major respects.  First, during war itself, 
there is a surge in government power, as it increases in scope, 
size, and intrusiveness.4  The war brings about higher taxes, 
wider conscription, more regulation of the economy, and 
suppression of civil liberties.5  Governments tend to spend more 
on war and preparing for war than on anything else.6  Indeed, 
prior to the advent of the modern welfare State in the twentieth 
century, governments usually spent more on war and preparing 
for war than all other things combined.7  The State was 
essentially a war making institution that did a few other things 
on the side.8 
 
 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, San Jose State University. 
1 A.F. Beringause, The Double Martyrdom of Randolph Bourne, 18 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 
594, 594 (1957). 
2 RANDOLPH BOURNE, The State, in THE RADICAL WILL: SELECTED WRITINGS 1911–
1918 360 (1977). 
3 Id.  For a biography of Bourne, see generally BRUCE CLAYTON, FORGOTTEN 
PROPHET: THE LIFE OF RANDOLPH BOURNE (Louisiana State Univ. Press 1984).  I 
capitalize the word “State” when using it in its broader sense, meaning government in 
general, to distinguish that meaning from the constituent states within a federal system 
of government such as the United States. 
4 Robert Higgs, Crisis, Bigger Government, and Ideological Change: Two Hypotheses 
on the Ratchet Phenomenon, 22 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HISTORY 2 (1985). 
5 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, The Civil War and Reconstruction, in GOVERNMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY A NEW HISTORY 188, 189 (2007). 
6  John Joseph Wallis, The National Era, in GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY: A NEW HISTORY 148, 152 (2007). 
7 Id. 
8 See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, War, Peace and the State, in 
EGALITARIANISM AS A REVOLT AGAINST NATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS (2d ed. 2000); BRUCE 
D. PORTER, WAR AND THE RISE OF THE STATE: THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
POLITICS (1994); CHARLES TILLY, THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN 
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The second respect in which “war is the health of the State” 
is what Robert Higgs and other economic historians have 
identified as the postwar ratchet effect.9  After the war ends, 
there is demobilization with some cut back in taxes, conscription, 
regulation, and restrictions on civil liberties, but governments 
rarely return to their prewar size and power.10  The State has 
assumed new functions and exercised new prerogatives that 
continue long after the fighting is over.11  In what follows we will 
survey how these two phenomena apply generally to government 
finance throughout the history of the United States, then look 
specifically and in detail at Civil War finance, make some 
comparisons with the financing of other major American wars, 
and finally consider the relevance of these observations for 
today’s War on Terror and financial crisis. 
I.  WAR AND U.S. GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Figure 1 shows total spending of the U.S. government as a 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1792 to the 
present.  By using the percentage of GDP, the graph adjusts 
spending for three factors: (a) any price inflation or deflation; (b) 
population growth; and (c) the growth of people’s real incomes.  If 
the percentage goes up, that means that real government 
spending per person is rising faster than the economy’s output.  
In other words, more of people’s incomes is going to the national 
government and less to the private sector (or in this case, to other 
levels of government).12 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPE (1975); and Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in 
BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 169 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985). 
9  Hummel, supra note 5, at 189. 
10 ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 59 (1987). 
11 Id. at 2; Bruce D. Porter, Parkinson’s Law Revisited: War and the Growth of 
Government, 60 THE PUBL. INTEREST 50, 58 (1980). 
12 For Figure 1, data on government expenditures come from U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1086–1134 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office 1975), pt. 2, as brought forward by BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL TABLES FISCAL YEAR 2008 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office 2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/hist.html.  Annual 
estimates for GDP are from Louis D. Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson, What Was the 
U.S. GDP Then? (MeasuringWorth 2008), http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/.  Their 
GDP numbers from 1929 forward coincide with those of the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, whereas previous estimates are drawn from various sources and become 
increasingly subject to error as you go back in time. 
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Fig. 1 
The graph shows both major peaks and minor peaks during 
wars.  If one looks closely, one can discern the impact of the War 
of 1812, the Mexican War (1846–1848), and the Spanish-
American War (1898).  But the Civil War (1861–1865), World 
War I (1914-1918), and World War II (1939-1945) all induce 
major peaks in national outlays.  Notice also the postwar ratchet 
effect.13  Thus, after the Civil War peak of around 13 percent of 
GDP, the postwar ratchet leaves government spending 50 
percent higher than its prewar level.  Indeed, federal 
expenditures even decline slightly as a percent of GDP during 
the Progressive Era of government activism in the early 
twentieth century.  The World War I ratchet nearly doubles 
national outlays, from about 2.5 percent of GDP prior to the war 
to 5 percent of GDP afterwards, despite the alleged Republican 
retrenchment of the nineteen twenties.14 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal caused another 
doubling of federal expenditures during the thirties.15  This 
peacetime increase is particularly anomalous because prior to the 
Great Depression, the general rule, not only in the U.S. but 
elsewhere in the industrial world, was for governments to rein in 
spending during depressions and recessions.  The fiscal impact of 
the Great Depression, however, is entirely dwarfed by the 
 
13 See Figure 1. 
14 See Figure 1; Randall G. Holcombe, Federal Government Growth Before the New 
Deal, 47 FREEMAN (1997). 
15 See Figure 1. 
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expenditure hike during World War II.  Even a brief post-World 
War II retrenchment never brings spending back to its New Deal 
level, and then the Korean (1950–1953) and Cold Wars stabilized 
national outlays at approximately twice that level. 
Figure 1 admittedly omits any expenditures by state and 
local governments.  Figure 2 adjusts for that omission beginning 
at the turn of the twentieth century.16  Unfortunately, we have 
no precise figures on how much state and local governments 
within the U.S. spent during the nineteenth century.  
Nonetheless, once we can add this spending, the overall pattern 
does not change.  We still observe wartime peaks and postwar 
ratchets.  Moreover, the impact of the New Deal is dampened a 
bit.  Prior to the thirties, state and local governments spent up to 
twice as much as the national government.  The New Deal made 
federal expenditures greater than those of state and local 
governments combined, and after World War II the pre-New Deal 
proportion is sometimes completely reversed, with federal 
expenditures fully twice as great.17  In short, part of the increase 
in federal spending during the administrations of President 
Roosevelt really represented a change of the locus of spending 
away from the state and local level. 
 
Fig. 2 
Prior to the American Civil War, the central government had 
miniscule peacetime budgets.18  The highest annual outlays 
reached was $74.2 million in 1858.19  That translates into about 
 
16 Sources for Figure 2 are the same as for Figure 1.  See supra note 12. 
17 See Figure 2. 
18 JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL, EMANCIPATING SLAVES, ENSLAVING FREE MEN: A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 221 (1996). 
19 Id. 
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$1.5 billion in today’s (2009) prices.20  Adjusting for population, 
the government in Washington was spending approximately 
$2.50 per person in 1858, or the equivalent of $50 per person per 
year today.21  This was less than 2 percent of GDP.  The best 
guesses of how much state and local governments spent at this 
time are less than one and a half times as much as the national 
government, making total spending at all levels of government at 
most 5 percent of national income.22  Compare that with today 
when all government expenditures account for more than one-
third of the economy’s total output.23 
The national debt, for all intents and purposes, had been 
briefly but completely paid off in 1835, under President Andrew 
Jackson.24  It had reemerged, mainly as a result of the Mexican 
War, but in 1860, it stood at a modest $65 million—less than 
annual outlays in 1858.25  What makes this doubly amazing is 
that there were only two sources of federal revenue at the time: a 
tariff, with relatively low duties because this was an era of 
expanding free trade; and the sale of public lands, on which 
Congress had been steadily reducing the price because of the 
growing appeal of homesteading.26  In short, most Americans 
paid no taxes whatsoever directly to the central government.27  
Their only regular contact with representatives of national 
authority would have been through the United States Post 
Office—if they had any contact at all.28 
 
20 I have used the Composite Consumer Price Index calculated by John J. 
McCusker, supplemented by more recent numbers from the Consumer Price Index, to 
deflate amounts to current prices.  See generally JOHN J. MCCUSKER, HOW MUCH IS THAT 
IN REAL MONEY? A HISTORICAL PRICE INDEX FOR USE AS A DEFLATOR OF MONEY VALUES 
IN THE ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES (1992). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 222. 
23 Id.  Total state and local revenue were found as averaging 1.41 times national 
revenue in the decade 1836–1845 and 1.15 times in the decade 1846–1855.  See Wallis, 
supra note 6, at 150; John J. Wallis, American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 
to 1990, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61, 61–82 (2000); John B. Legler et al., U.S. City 
Finances and the Growth of Government, 1850–1902, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 347, 347–56 
(1988); and Richard Sylla et al., Banks and State Public Finance in the New Republic: The 
United States, 1790–1860, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 391, 391–403 (1987).  Any conceivable 
differences between government revenue and expenditures could not possibly push those 
ratios much above 1.50.  According to these estimates, total government revenue averaged 
4.0 percent and 4.2 percent of GNP in the two antebellum intervals.  For detailed data on 
expenditures of only state government see generally CHARLES FRANK HOLT, THE ROLE OF 
STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1820–1902: A 
QUANTITATIVE STUDY (1977). 
24 Hummel, supra note 5, at 190. 
25 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 222. 
26 Hummel, supra note 5, at 190–91. 
27 Id. 
28 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 222. 
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Even the monetary system was significantly deregulated as 
a result of the prior Jacksonian “divorce” of banking and 
government at the national level.29  There was no federally 
chartered central bank, and the Treasury, as much as feasible, 
avoided dealing with the many state-chartered banks.  The only 
legally recognized money was specie, that is, gold and silver 
coins.  Although banks were still regulated by the state 
governments, many states had instituted a de facto regime of 
quasi-free banking.  The economy’s currency consisted solely of 
state bank notes redeemable for specie on demand.  Private 
competition thus regulated the circulation of paper money.  
Despite trumped-up charges of wildcat banking, it was by 
comparison a relatively stable and crisis-free monetary system, 
as attested to by the painless financing of the Mexican War from 
1846 to 1848 and the unprecedented quiescence of monetary 
issues in national politics in the decade prior to the Civil War.30 
II.  THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR 
The cost of waging the Civil War for the Union would 
ultimately average $1.75 million per day and reach a total of $1.3 
billion for 1865 alone.31  Figure 1 shows federal spending 
climbing to 13 percent of GDP, but this may be an 
underestimate.  Annual GDP figures during this early period 
must be interpolated between decennial census data, and so 
estimates vary.  Moreover, the GDP figures used in the graph, 
from the work of Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, 
include Confederate output during the war, which understates 
the war burden unless Confederate government expenditures are 
included.32  Earlier GDP estimates of Thomas Senior Berry would 
put national outlays in 1865 at just under 15 percent of northern 
GDP, beginning to approach what the central government spends 
nowadays during peacetime.33  It is hard to decide from which 
angle this statistic is more remarkable: that government 
spending rose from such infinitesimal lows almost to today’s 
heights in only four years, or that today’s federal authorities 
 
29 Hummel, supra note 5, at 191. 
30 Id. 
31 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 221–22. 
32 Johnston and Williamson estimate 1865 nominal GDP at $9.88 billion.  See 
Johnston & Williamson, supra note 12. 
33 THOMAS SENIOR BERRY, PRODUCTION AND POPULATION SINCE 1789: REVISED 
GNP SERIES IN CONSTANT DOLLARS 27 (1988), whose estimate of 1865 nominal Gross 
National Product (not much different than GDP) is $8.98 billion. 
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regularly spend more than they did during the most expensive 
year of the country’s bloodiest war.34 
How did the administration of President Abraham Lincoln 
finance this enormous increase?  No one needs to be reminded 
that government cannot create resources out of thin air.  There 
are four potential ways of funding government expenditures, 
three of which are primary.35  The least important is government 
sale of goods and services; the same way private individuals and 
business raise funds.  The Post Office, after all, sells stamps, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture sells pamphlets, and the state of 
California sells lottery tickets (with a monopoly that suppresses 
market competition).36  Although we have already observed that 
the sale of public land was one of two sources of national revenue 
prior to the Civil War, selling goods and services is not normally 
a major source of government revenue.37 
The three primary ways of paying for government 
expenditures are (1) current taxes; (2) government borrowing, 
which is equivalent to future taxes, since even if the 
government’s debt is never paid off, the present value of all 
future interest payments is roughly equal to the total value of the 
debt; and (3) the issuing of money, which generates inflation and 
an implicit tax on people’s cash balances, as money’s purchasing 
power declines.38  The technical term that economists use for this 
last source of revenue is seigniorage, from the French word for 
feudal lord, because in medieval France it was the lord who had a 
monopoly on the mint and appropriated seigniorage.39 
The Civil War’s unprecedented expenditures struck at the 
very moment that the Union’s anticipated revenues fell.40  
Although the outgoing Congress had raised tariff rates even 
before Lincoln assumed the presidency, it was clear that the 
Treasury Department was not going to be able to collect any 
duties from the South in the foreseeable future.41  Meanwhile, a 
 
34 Hummel, supra note 5, at 197.  I must confess that my earlier estimate that 
federal expenditures reached 20 percent of GDP in 1865 is too high.  Id. 
35 See infra notes 46–49. 
36 United States Postal Service, http://shop.usps.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2009); 
United States Department of Agriculture, http://www.usda.gov/wps (last visited Aug. 1, 
2009); California State Lottery, http://www.calottery.com/default.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 
2009). 
37 Hummel, supra note 5, at 190–91. 
38 Id. at 197–99. 
39 See Kurt Schuler, The World History of Free Banking, in THE EXPERIENCE OF 
FREE BANKING 30–32 (Kevin Dowd ed., 1992);; Black’s Law Dictionary 1388–1389 (8th ed. 
1999). 
40 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 222.  See also ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, 
AND PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 25 (1959). 
41 Hummel, supra note 5, at 197. 
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Homestead Act finally passed Congress in 1862, implementing 
the Republican Party’s promise that settlers get free title to 160 
acres of government land after five years of settlement.42 
Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Portland Chase, 
had been an abolitionist and a former Democrat.43  The latter fact 
meant that he had a strong dislike for governmental control of 
the economy; he despised government debt, paper money, and 
internal taxes.44  A good government in Chase’s eyes was a frugal 
government, yet he was forced to resort to a mixture of all the 
financial expedients that he disliked.45  In 1861, Congress 
implemented a direct tax of $20 million on real estate; although 
this tax was to be administered by the individual state 
governments,46 it was the first internal tax Americans had paid 
to Washington City in forty-four years.47  However, the more 
extensive Internal Revenue Act passed by Congress one year 
later was not administered through the states but by the newly 
established Commission of Internal Revenues.48  Rather than 
recite all the myriad details of this and other Union revenue 
measures, it suffices to quote James G. Blaine, an up-and-coming 
Maine Republican, who called it “one of the most searching, 
thorough, comprehensive systems of taxation ever devised by any 
Government.”49 
In addition to all-encompassing excise, sales, and license 
taxes, the Internal Revenue Act of 1862 also introduced stamp 
taxes on most legal documents and an inheritance tax.50  
Collection required the creation of an extensive Internal Revenue 
bureaucracy reaching into every hamlet and town.51  Even more 
significant was a national income tax.  Although the income tax 
authorized in August 1861 was never actually collected, more 
stringent legislation, passed in July 1862, provided the 
 
42 Id. 
43 Reinhard H. Luthin, Salmon P. Chase’s Political Career Before the Civil War, 29 
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV 517, 517–19 (1943). 
44 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 221. 
45 Id. at 222. 
46 BERT W. REIN, AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE UNION FINANCING OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 16 (1962). 
47 HARRY EDWIN SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY 
FROM 1861 TO 1871 23–24 (1914). 
48 Id. at 271–72. 
49 James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield, with a 
Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860 vol. 1 433 (1884). 
50 REIN, supra note 46 at 17–18; JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE 
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 203 (1982). 
51 For an extensive discussion about the creation of the IRS and the 
administration and collection of taxes during the Civil War see SMITH, supra note 47, at 
270–91. 
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government its first ever revenues from that source.52  The tax 
ultimately covered all annual incomes over $600 (as low as 
$6,000 in today’s prices) at graduated rates from three to seven 
and a half percent.53  To ensure compliance, the government 
adopted a British practice and withheld money from people’s 
income when it could.54  With all these measures, the United 
States achieved higher taxation per capita than any other nation 
by the end of the Civil War.55  But all the new and old taxes 
combined were just sufficient to cover about one-fifth of the Civil 
War’s monetary cost, as indicated in Figure 3.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 
Meanwhile, borrowing covered about two-thirds of the war’s 
cost.57  Chase floated some loans directly to the general public, 
with the aid of an extravagant publicity campaign handled by 
private financier, Jay Cooke.58  For most of its borrowing, 
however, the Union had to rely on banks, and this required that 
Congress undermine the restraints built into the antebellum 
financial system.59  The Treasury’s initial war loan of $150 
million had put a heavy strain on those northern banks that had 
subscribed.60  Once the financial community realized that the 
war would not be quick or easy, Treasury securities dropped in 
value.61  As gold reserves drained from the bank vaults, state 
 
52 Id. at 52–53. 
53 Id. at 52. 
54 Id. at 53–54. 
55 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 223. 
56 See Figure 3; HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 223. 
57 See Figure 3. 
58 JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY 262–263 (1995); MCPHERSON, 
supra note 50, at 202. 
59 WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL, A HISTORY OF THE GREENBACKS 20 (1903); HOWARD 
BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF NATION-BUILDING 229 (2000). 
60 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 224. 
61 MITCHELL, supra note 59, at 38; REIN, supra note 46, at 35. 
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governments permitted the banks to suspend specie payments in 
December of 1861.62 
In order to harness banking more tightly to the war effort 
and create a market for the Treasury’s debt, the Republicans 
drafted the National Currency Acts of 1863 and 1864.63  These 
acts fashioned a network of nationally chartered banks, still with 
us today, regulated by a new federal Comptroller of the 
Currency, an official still with us today as well.64  National banks 
could issue bank notes supplied to them by the Comptroller, but 
only if they purchased a roughly equivalent value of war bonds.65  
To ensure the national banks did not suffer competition from 
state-chartered banks, Congress imposed a 10 percent tax in 
1865 on the face value of all state banknotes.66  State banks were 
henceforth confined to providing other financial services.67 
Finally, roughly 15 percent of the war’s financial outlay was 
covered through the first fiat money issued since the 
Constitution’s ratification.68  In early 1862, Congress passed the 
Legal Tender Act, empowering Secretary Chase to issue a form of 
paper bills that became popularly known as Greenbacks.69  The 
final total of Greenbacks put into circulation reached $431 
million, supplemented by a small quantity of interest-bearing 
notes and other currency.70  All this government paper coupled 
with the private bank notes doubled the Union’s money stock by 
1863.71  The consequent inflation put specie at a premium.72  
Greenback dollars had fallen in July of 1864 to a low of 35 cents’ 
worth of gold.73  While gold circulated at a premium over 
Greenbacks in the northeast, Greenbacks were only accepted at a 
discount from gold on the west coast.74 
Adjusting for inflation, workers’ wages actually fell by one-
third in the North, and economic historians are still debating 
 
62 MITCHELL, supra note 59, at 40; REIN, supra note 46, at 35. 
63 MCPHERSON, supra note 50 at 204; REIN, supra note 46, at 43. 
64 George A. Selgin & Lawrence H. White, Monetary Reform and the Redemption 
of National Bank Notes, 1863-1913, 68 BUS. HIST. REV. 205, 207 (1994). 
65 BODENHORN, supra note 59, at 229. 
66 BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN 
THE CIVIL WAR 347 (1970). 
67 Id. 
68 See Figure 3. 
69 MCPHERSON, supra note 50, at 202. 
70 REIN, supra note 46, at 49. 
71 Milton Friedman, Price, Income, and Monetary Changes in Three Wartime 
Periods 42 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 624 (1952). 
72 GARY M. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 298 
(9th ed. 2002); Bruce G. Carruthers & Sarah Babb, The Color of Money and the Nature of 
Value: Greenbacks and Gold in Postbellum America, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1556, 1563 (1996). 
73 Hummel, supra note 5, at 199. 
74 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 226. 
Do Not Delete 10/15/2009 4:04 PM 
2009] Civil War Finance:  Lessons for Today 601 
how much of that was due to heavy taxes versus high 
seigniorage.75  Furthermore, the Greenbacks were made legal 
tender for all payments, public and private, except tariff duties 
and interest on the Treasury’s debt.76  This led to one of the most 
astonishing cases of intellectual honesty on the part of a public 
official, when five years after the war had ended, Chief Justice 
Salmon P. Chase implicitly branded his prior actions as 
Secretary of the Treasury unconstitutional in the Hepburn 
decision.77  However, soon after, President Ulysses Grant packed 
the Court so that it effectively reversed itself the following year.78 
Figure 3 also reveals that Confederate States of America—
being smaller and poorer than the Union—had to rely much more 
heavily on seigniorage for war finance.  The two percentages for 
Confederate taxation reflect the fact that formal taxes raised 
only 7 percent of the war’s cost, whereas informal taxation 
through direct military seizures along with some donations 
raised another 17 percent.79  The combined total thus actually 
exceeded the proportion for Union taxation, but the ability of the 
Confederacy to borrow fell far short of the Union’s.80  The 
Confederate Treasury ultimately issued over $1 billion worth of 
currency, covering more than half the war’s cost to the South.81  
The Union blockade and an additional $45 million in paper 
currency issued by individual southern states contributed to the 
monetary depreciation.82  Southerners therefore suffered from 
hyperinflation, with prices rising by 2,675 percent from 1860 to 
1865, compared with 90.5 percent in the North.83 
 
75 Id. at 234, 380. 
76 Hummel, supra note 5, at 199. 
77 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869) (striking down the Greenbacks’ 
retroactive legal-tender provision); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88 PART I 677 (1971). 
78 FAIRMAN, supra note 77, at 677; Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870–1871).  
For classic economic studies of the Greenbacks, see generally MITCHELL, supra note 59 
and WESLEY C. MITCHELL, GOLD, PRICES & WAGES UNDER THE GREENBACK STANDARD 
(Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1966) (1908).  For a good introduction to the debate about 
northern real wages see Stephen J. DeCanio & Joel Mokyr, Inflation and the Wage Lag 
During the American Civil War, 14 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 311, 311–36 (1977). 
79 See Figure 3. 
80 See Figure 3; David J. Bolt & Mary Mathewes Kassis, War Finance: Economic 
and Historic Lessons, 95 SOC. STUD. 188, 189–90 (2004). 
81 Id. 
82 HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 228. 
83 For surveys of Confederate finance, see Hummel, supra note 5, at 197–203.  See 
also generally DOUGLAS B. BALL, FINANCIAL FAILURE AND CONFEDERATE DEFEAT (1991), 
RICHARD CECIL TODD, CONFEDERATE FINANCE (1954), and CHRISTOPHER SCHWAB, THE 
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 1861–1865: A FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF 
THE SOUTH DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1901).  The standard estimate, in Eugene M. Lerner, 
Monetary and Fiscal Programs of the Confederate Government, 1861–65, 62 J. POL. ECON. 
506, 507 (1954) is 5 percent from taxation, 5 percent from seizures and donations, 30 
percent from borrowing, and 60 percent from the seigniorage.  However, JACK 
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III.  COMPARISONS 
Upon defeat of the Confederacy at the end of the war, the 
U.S. government’s debt had climbed from just under $65 million 
to nearly $2.8 billion.84  The interest alone on this debt 
commanded about 40 percent of the central government’s outlays 
into the mid-1870s (as compared with less than 10 percent 
today).85  To their credit, the post Civil War administrations ran 
an unbroken string of twenty-eight annual budget surpluses from 
the war’s end to the depression of 1893, despite also cutting 
taxes.86  This decline can be observed in Figure 4, which shows 
the national debt as a percent of GDP.87 
Fig. 4 
The trajectory of the national debt in Figure 4 provides 
additional confirmation of Bourne’s maxim, “War is the health of 
the State.”  All the major and minor spikes in the debt up 
through World War II, except for the rise during the Great 
Depression, are associated with wars.88  The national debt 
reaches its highest level during World War II, at about 110 
 
HIRSHLEIFER, DISASTER AND RECOVERY: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 37–41 (1963), points out 
that these percentages ignore the resources gained through uncompensated 
impressments.  Adding them into seizures changes the percentages to 7 percent from 
taxes, 17 percent from seizures and donations, 24 percent from loans, and 52 percent from 
seigniorage.  See also Richard C. K. Burdekin & Farrokh K. Langdana, War Finance in 
the Southern Confederacy, 1861–1865, 30 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 352, 353 (1993). 
84 Bolt & Kassis, supra note 80 at 189–90; HUMMEL, supra note 18, at 331. 
85 Hummel, supra note 5, at 217. 
86 Id. 
87 See Figure 4 (The sources for Figure 4 are the same as for Figure 1, listed in n. 
12 above.  The total public debt excludes the holdings of government trust funds, such as 
OASDI and HI, to avoid double counting, although it does include the holdings of the 
Federal Reserve System). 
88 See Figure 4. 
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percent of GDP.89  The graph also helps to illustrate two other 
important relationships.  Prior to World War II, there were four 
significant periods of debt reduction: post-American Revolution, 
post-War of 1812, post-Civil War, and post-World War I.90  Each 
period was also one of tax cuts.91  While raising taxes to balance 
the budget may be good accounting, it appears to be bad politics.  
The only exception is the decline of the national debt as a percent 
of GDP following World War II.92  While there were some tax cuts 
under Presidents Harry Truman and John Kennedy, the main 
factor eroding the debt was high inflation, peaking in the late 
1970s at double-digits.93  In fact, the rise in government debt as a 
percent of GDP under President Ronald Reagan had as much to 
do with the Federal Reserve’s taming of inflation as with his 
fiscal policies.94 
A second relationship reflected in Figure 4 is the fact that, 
prior to the Great Depression, the general rule throughout the 
developed world was that governments always ran budget 
surpluses, except during wars or inadvertently during 
depressions.95  This was true of the U.S. government until the 
Great Depression and the subsequent triumph of Keynesian 
economics.96  In the eighty years since 1929, in contrast, the 
federal government has managed only twelve surpluses: four 
under Truman after World War II, three under President Dwight 
Eisenhower, one under President Richard Nixon, and four under 
President Bill Clinton, after the ending of the Cold War.97  The 
War on Terror has simply started to bring the national debt as a 
percent of GDP back up to Cold War levels.98 
It is also instructive to compare Civil War finance with the 
financing of three other major wars displayed in Figure 5.  
Finance of the American Revolution stands as a precursor to 
Confederate finance, with a similar low level of formal taxation 
(6 percent), heavy reliance on seigniorage (75 percent), and 
 
89 DENNIS S. IPPOLITO, WHY BUDGETS MATTER: BUDGET POLICY & AMERICAN 
POLITICS 4 (2003). 
90 See Figure 4; Benjamin U. Ratchford, History of the Federal Debt in the United 
States, 2 AM. ECON. ASS’N. 131, 137–41 (1947). 
91 Ratchford, supra note 90, at 137–41. 
92 See Figure 4. 
93 Iwan Morgan, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and the New Democratic Economics, 
47 HIST. J. 1015, 1015–1027 (2004). 
94 ROBERT J, SAMEULSON, THE GREAT INFLATION AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE PAST 
AND FUTURE OF AMERICA AFFLUENCE 105–08, 135–38 (2008). 
95 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 5 (2009). 
96 Ratchford, supra note 90, at 131–32, 137–41. 
97 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 95, at 21–22. 
98 See Figure 4. 
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resulting hyperinflation.99  On the other hand, the proportions 
during World War I are almost identical to those of the Union 
during the Civil War.100  In both cases, seigniorage covered about 
15 percent of the war’s cost.101  The resulting cumulative inflation 
during World War I was more severe, however, ranking as the 
highest the U.S. had experienced up to that time (outside of the 
Confederacy) since the American Revolution.102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 
One difference between the Civil War and World War I was 
how the fiat money was generated.  Greenbacks were simple fiat 
money, printed by the Treasury and used directly to make 
government purchases.103  But the Federal Reserve (Fed) was set 
up in 1914, shortly before U.S. entry into World War I, and it 
replaced Treasury-issued fiat money with central bank-issued 
fiat money.104  The process is a bit more difficult to understand 
but works out the same financially.  The Fed simply creates 
money out of thin air and loans it to the Treasury, which in turns 
spends it.105  Or in the case of World War I, the Fed actually 
loaned money to private banks so long as they purchased 
Treasury securities, re-loaning the created money to the 
 
99 See Figure 5.  The figures in Figure 5 for the American Revolution are derived 
from E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
FINANCE, 1776–1790 (1961).  Those for World Wars I and II come from GARY M. WALTON 
& HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 418, 500 (9th ed. 2002).  
Additional details on U.S. finance of the two world wars can be found in ROBERT HIGGS, 
The World Wars, in GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY A NEW HISTORY (2007) 
and HIGGS, supra note 10. 
100 Compare Figure 5 with Figure 3. 
101 See Figure 5 and Figure 3. 
102 See Lawrence H. Officer & Samuel H. Williamson, Annual Inflation Rates in the 
United States, 1775–2008 (MeasuringWorth 2009), http://www.measuringworth.org/ 
inflation/. 
103 WALTON & ROCKOFF, supra note 99, at 457. 
104 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1867–1960 189 (1971). 
105 Bob McTeer and Pamela Villarreal, How the Fed Creates Money, BRIEF 
ANALYSIS (Nat’l Ctr. for Pol’y Analysis, Dallas, Texas), Feb, 28, 2008, at 1. 
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Treasury.106  The Treasury pays interest directly or indirectly to 
the Fed for these loans but the Fed, after covering its operating 
expenses, has rebated around 90 percent of these interest 
payments back to the Treasury.107  The one thing that does 
change under a central bank is who is in charge of issuing fiat 
money, and the resulting incentives.108 
World War II finance stands out for two reasons.  
Seigniorage covered nearly a quarter of the war’s cost, the 
highest percentage for any U.S. war outside of the two 
hyperinflations: the American Revolution and the Confederacy.109  
By pegging the interest rate on Treasuries at very low rates (2.5 
percent for long-term Treasury bonds, and 0.375 percent for 
short-term Treasury bills), the Fed automatically monetized 
much of the World War II debt.110  The total money stock tripled 
and inflation became so rampant that the government imposed 
comprehensive wage and price controls, along with rationing, 
when the inevitable shortages resulted.111  This heavy reliance on 
seigniorage undermines the widely believed myth that it was 
wartime deficit financing that finally ended the Great 
Depression.112  What looked like fiscal policy was really monetary 
policy in disguise. 
Taxation covered another 40 percent of World War II’s cost, 
the highest percentage for any major U.S. war until the Cold 
War.113  This was mainly achieved by expanding the coverage of 
the income tax, which furnished three-fourths of all wartime tax 
receipts.114  Despite major peacetime tax hikes under both 
Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, only 4 
million Americans were touched by the national income tax as 
late as 1939.115  Five years later the number was around 42 
million.116  It was F.D.R. and World War II that brought income 
taxes to the common man.117 
 
106 DONALD R. WELLS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: A HISTORY 29–30 (2004). 
107 Edward Flaherty, Debunking the Federal Reserve Conspiracy Theories, 
http://www.publiceye.org/conspire/flaherty/Federal_Reserve.html. 
108 See supra notes 103–107 and accompanying text. 
109 See Figure 5. 
110 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 104 at 562–63. 
111 WALTON & ROCKOFF, supra note 99 at 554–55. 
112 See Figure 5. 
113 See Figure 5. 
114 WALTON & ROCKOFF, supra note 99 at 554–55. 
115 History of Income Tax, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE (Ed. Allison 
McClintic Marion, Gale Cengage, 2001), available at http://www.enotes.com/business-
finance-encyclopedia/income-tax-history. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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IV.  LESSONS? 
The impact of the War on Terror on government finance can 
be gleaned from Figure 6, which depicts both federal 
expenditures and receipts as a percent of GDP from 1940 to 
2008.118  The end of the Cold War brought a modest decline of 
expenditures from a high of 23 percent to less than 19 percent of 
GDP, bestowing the peace dividend of the Clinton years.119  The 
wars in Afghanistan (2001–present) and Iraq (2003–present) 
have merely pushed spending back up toward Cold War levels.120  
More striking is the behavior of federal revenue, which shows far 
greater consistency than expenditures, having bumped up 
against 20 percent of GDP since the Korean War, for well over 
half a century.121  That is quite an astonishing statistic when you 
think about all the changes in the tax code over the intervening 
years.  Tax rates go up, tax rates go down, and the total bite out 
of the economy remains relatively constant.122  This suggests that 
20 percent is some kind of structural-political limit for federal 
taxes within the United States.  It also suggests that variations 
in the deficit resulted primarily from changes in spending rather 
than in taxes. 
Fig. 6 
 
118 The sources for Figure 6 are the same as for Figure 1.  See supra note 12. 
119 See Figure 6. 
120 See Figure 6. 
121 See Figure 6. 
122 See Figure 6. 
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Another implication of Figure 6 is that throughout the post-
World War II period, taxes have covered the greater portion of 
national spending.  All the acrimonious political debates about 
the size of the deficit have been squabbles about marginal items.  
The deficit never exceeded 6 percent of GDP and was usually far 
less, leaving little room for reliance on either government 
borrowing or seigniorage.123  In fact, seigniorage has become an 
utterly trivial source of government revenue, not just in the 
United States but also throughout the developed world.124  This is 
partly a consequence of globalization, in which international 
competition between central banks restrains their monetary 
expansions125 and partly the result of sophisticated financial 
systems, with fractional reserve banking, in which most of the 
money that people actually use is created privately by banks and 
other financial institutions rather than by government.126  
Consider how little of your own cash balances are held in the 
form of Federal Reserve notes and Treasury coin versus in the 
form of bank deposits and money market funds.  Such privately 
created money, even when its quantity expands, provides no 
seigniorage.  Consequently, during America’s Great Inflation of 
the 1970s, seigniorage accounted for only 2 percent of federal 
revenue, which translates into less than half a percent of GDP.127 
Unlike the War on Terror, the current financial crisis 
appears destined to have a gargantuan impact on government 
finance.  The critical date was Thursday, September 18, 2008, 
when the interest rate on Treasury bills temporarily went 
negative, accompanied by the misbehavior of other credit market 
indicators.128  This was what caused Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to hit the panic 
button.129  Up until this point, the Fed had conducted various 
bailouts, Bear Stearns being the most prominent, but had not 
 
123 See Data360.org, Federal Government Surplus (Deficit) as Percent of GDP, 
http:www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=409. 
124 Posting of Jeffrey Rogers Hummel to Liberty and Power Group Blog, 
http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/53544.html (Aug. 20, 2008, 23:10 EST). 
125 Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarik, Globalization and Developing Countries-A 
Shrinking Tax Base? (Jan 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Department of 
Economics, UCSC Paper 615), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucscecon/615/. 
126 Posting of Jeffrey Rogers Hummel to Liberty and Power Group Blog, 
http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/53544.html (Aug. 20, 2008, 23:10 EST). 
127 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Death and Taxes, Including Inflation: The Public 
versus Economists, 4 ECON. J. WATCH 48 (2007). 
128 David R. Henderson, Bernanke’s Hype, FORBES.COM, Sep. 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/28/bernanke-bailout-crisis-oped-
cx_drh_0928henderson.html. 
129 Jason Turcotte, Who Hit the Panic Button?, REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, Oct. 29, 
2008, at 10S. 
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allowed those actions to affect the money stock.130  In Fed speak, 
the interventions had been sterilized.131  But after September 18, 
the monetary base, which consists of government created money 
directly controlled by the Fed, went through the roof.132 
Fig. 7 
Figure 7 shows the behavior of the monetary base since the 
Great Inflation and before the current crisis, mostly under Fed 
Chair Alan Greenspan.133  The base has two components: (a) 
 
130 Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Big Bailout, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Mar. 14, 
2008. 
131 A sterilized intervention is a way for a central bank to alter its debt composition 
without affecting its monetary base.  See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ 
sterilizedintervention.asp (last visited August 1, 2009). 
132 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE H.3 (503): AGGREGATE RESERVES OF 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY BASE (Oct. 9, 2008). 
133 The source for Figure 7 is the enormously convenient website of the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (last visited July 26, 2009).  For the 
monetary base I have used the Board of Governors Monetary Base, Not Adjusted for 
Changes in Reserve Requirements (BOGUMBNS).  Id.  For currency in circulation, I have 
used the Currency Component of M1 (CURRNS).  Id.  I have subtracted the latter from 
the former to get total reserves.  The St. Louis Fed website does give several alternative 
direct estimates of reserves.  However, those compiled by the St. Louis Fed are adjusted 
for changes in reserve requirements, whereas those compiled by the Board of Governors 
exclude any excess reserves held in the form of vault cash, all required clearing balances, 
and Fed float.  This critical detail can only be found in the footnotes of the Federal 
Reserve System, Board of Governors, weekly Statistical Release H.3: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/.  For some idea of how massive the resulting 
distortion can be, consider December 2007 where the Board of Governors reported total 
reserves of $42.7 billion.  If you add in vault cash not covering reserve requirements, that 
number jumps to $60.3 billion.  Additionally, when you bring in required clearing 
balances and float, the number rises to $72.6 billion, 70 percent greater than the board’s 
estimate.  If the distortion were consistent across time, the Board’s reserve totals would 
still tell us something, but the distortion is not close to consistent across time, in part 
because banks increasingly used vault cash in their ATMs.  Required clearing balances 
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currency and coin in the hands of the general public and (b) 
reserves held by banks and other depository institutions.  
Between 1986 and 2005, the total base grew at a steady rate of 
under 6.5 percent annually.134  But nearly all of the growth was 
concentrated in currency, much of which was going abroad.135  
The Fed estimates that the proportion of U.S. currency held by 
foreigners rose from 25 to 50 percent over these nineteen 
years.136  As a result total bank reserves were almost constant.137 
Fig. 8 
Figure 8 brings base growth forward to the present.138  Talk 
about a “hockey stick,” over the mere three months after 
September 18 the base doubled, from $850 billion to $1.7 
trillion.139  Almost all of that increase was concentrated in bank 
reserves, which during that short period exploded by an 
incredible factor of thirteen.140  Moreover, the Fed’s balance sheet  
 
arise out of the Fed’s check-clearing operations, pay interest.  For an explanation, see E. 
J. Stevens, Required Clearing Balances, 29 FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON. REV. 1, 
2–14 (1993). 
134 David R. Henderson & Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Greenspan’s Monetary Policy in 
Retrospect Discretion or Rules?, 109 CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPERS 1, 3 (2008). 
135 Id. at 3. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Figure 8 was directly created on the St. Louis Fed website.  See supra note 133, 
series BOGUMBNS. 
139 See Figure 8. 
140 See Figure 8. 
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grew even larger, as depicted in Figure 9.141  It peaked at $2.3 
trillion in December 2008, as the Treasury loaned over half a 
trillion of newly borrowed money to the Fed, which turned 
around and loaned it to foreign central banks through currency 
swaps.142  The Fed’s balance sheet has since fallen back down to 
$1.8 trillion as of February 11, 2009, but that is still more than 
twice its size less than half a year ago.143 
Fig. 9 
Under normal circumstances, such a massive and sudden 
monetary expansion would bring both high inflation and great 
seigniorage.  However, these are not normal circumstances, and 
so far we have seen neither.  Whether the Fed’s actions will 
ultimately bring inflation or not is still an open question that 
 
141 The source for Figure 9 is Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, weekly 
Statistical Release H.4.1.  See FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE H.4.1: FACTORS 
AFFECTING RESERVE BALANCES, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/.  See also 
posting of Jeffrey Rogers Hummel to Liberty & Power Group Blog, 
http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/61061.html (Feb. 2, 2009, 12:53 EST) and posting of Jeffrey 
Rogers Hummel to Liberty & Power Group Blog, http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/60613.html 
(Jan. 26, 2009, 12:15 EST). 
142 James Hamilton, Federal Reserve Balance Sheet, ECONOBROWSER, 
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2008/12/federal_reserve_1.html (12/21/08). 
143 See FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE H.4.1: FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE 
BALANCES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITION STATEMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANKS (Feb. 12, 2009). 
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depends largely on its ability to reverse course as the new money 
begins to circulate throughout the economy.  However, a virtually 
unnoticed change in the Fed’s operations ensures that its actions 
will not contribute much seigniorage to federal finance.  Buried 
within the bailout bill enacted on October 3, 2008, setting up the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was a provision 
permitting the Fed to pay interest on bank reserves.144  The Fed 
did so, and currently the interest that banks earn on their 
reserves is set at the Fed’s target interest rate for Federal 
funds.145 
This seemingly technical change not only gives banks an 
incentive to just hold reserves rather than loan them out—
thereby dampening increases in bank created money and in the 
price level—but it also essentially converts reserves into more 
government debt.146  Paper fiat money, whether in the form of 
Greenbacks or Federal Reserve notes, earns no interest and 
therefore allows the government to purchase real resources 
without incurring any future tax liability.147  Currency and coin 
will continue to earn no interest and therefore be a minor source 
of government seigniorage.148  But with the Fed having to divert 
potential government revenue to pay interest on the base money 
held by banks, seigniorage, already trivial, has virtually been 
eliminated as a source of future funding.149  And this constraint 
will become tighter as the general public continues to replace its 
use of currency with reliance upon bank debit cards and other 
forms of electronic fund transfers.150 
In short, the U.S. government is now virtually confined to 
only two sources of revenue: (1) current taxes and (2) borrowing, 
which represents future taxes.  Furthermore, this restriction 
arises at a moment when government expenditures are 
programmed to soar upward.151  Even before the current financial 
crisis, the aging of the baby boomers portended unprecedented 
 
144 Press Release, Federal Reserve (Oct. 6, 2008). 
145 Id.; Press Release, Federal Reserve (Dec. 16, 2008). 
146 Posting of Jeffrey Rogers Hummel to Liberty & Power Group Blog, 
http://hnn.us/blogs/entires/58090.html (Oct. 25, 2008, 18:10 EST). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Posting of Jeffrey Rogers Hummel to Liberty & Power Group Blog, 
http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/58090.html (Dec. 10, 2008, 21:27 EST); Posting of Jeffrey 
Rogers Hummel to Liberty & Power Group Blog, http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/56095.html 
(October 25, 2008, 18:10 EST); Posting of Jeffrey Rogers Hummel to Liberty & Power 
Group Blog, http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/55621.html (Oct. 13, 2008, 22:49 EST). 
151 Press Release, The White House, White House Releases State by State 
Numbers; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to Save or Create 3.5 Million Jobs 
(Feb. 17, 2009). 
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increases in Social Security and Medicare.152  Now add to that a 
$700 billion TARP, President Barack Obama’s nearly $800 fiscal 
stimulus, plus whatever additional money Congress appropriates 
for further financial bailouts.153  Federal expenditures could 
therefore realistically rise from a little over one-fifth of GDP to 
over one-third within a single year.  Some of these expenditures, 
particularly the TARP, will supposedly be reversed after the 
financial crisis is over.154  But others will surely join social 
insurance in permanently ratcheting up the total. 
Before jumping too hastily to the conclusion that Bourne’s 
maxim has become obsolete—with financial crises now replacing 
war as the health of the State—recall the 20-percent-of-GDP 
ceiling on total federal tax receipts that has proved binding for 
over half a century.  The barrier may only be breachable during a 
truly major war, such as the Civil War or World War II, and even 
during the height of World War II, when the proportion of federal 
tax revenue was at its highest for all of U.S. history, it never 
reached even 25 percent of GDP.155  The prospects are therefore 
sobering.  Everyone knows that there is a limit to how much debt 
an individual or institution can pile on if future income is rigidly 
fixed. 
Although many governments around the world have 
experienced sovereign defaults, U.S. Treasury securities have 
long been considered entirely risk free.156  Yet that may be 
changing already.  Economists have started considering a 
possible Treasury default, while the business news media and 
investment rating agencies have begun openly discussing a 
potential risk premium on the interest rate that the U.S. 
government must pay.157  The premiums of the much (and 
unfairly) maligned credit default swaps recently raised the 
probability of a U.S. Treasury default from a 1 percent chance 
over the next 10 years to a 6 percent chance.158  The market for 
credit default swaps prices the default risk on the bonds of some 
 
152 Ronald Lee & Jonathan Skinner, Will Aging Baby Boomers Bust the Federal 
Budget?, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 117 (1999). 
153 Press Release, The White House, White House Releases State by State 
Numbers; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to Save or Create 3.5 Million Jobs 
(Feb. 17, 2009). 
154 H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted). 
155 Press Release, Republican Policy Committee, Tax Overpayment Causes Record 
Tax Burden (Feb. 6, 2001). 
156 Greg Ip, We’re Borrowing Like Mad.  Can the U.S. Pay It Back? WASH. POST, 
Jan. 11, 2009 at B1. 
157 Id. and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Emperor’s Dangerous Clothes, 5 THE 
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE article 3 (2008), http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss2/art3/. 
158 Id. 
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European governments still higher.159  War, not only the health 
of the State, can of course bring about the demise of a State, as 
the Confederate example reminds us.160  We can only begin to 
wonder whether fiscal crises will bring the demise of the modern 
welfare State. 
 
 
159 Jonathan Tirone & Zoe Schneeweiss, Austria Default Risk Passes Italy’s as East 
Bet Sours (Update 1) BLOOMBERG (March 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601095&refer=east_europe&sid=av0_TxrNeFvg. 
160 Lieutenant Colonel H. Wayne Elliott, Book Reviews: A Government of Our Own, 
148 MIL. L. REV. 281 (1995). 
